Wednesday, May 25, 2011

New Author Page


Dear Friends,
   Over the last few weeks, I've been realizing that my blog devoted to Napoleon has become a bit intermixed with other material. I'm very exciting to be writing fictional material and am very pleased to share with you all. However, I do believe it's time to diversify my blogs. As such, I've established a blog specifically for my writing. Please check out my new adventures at: http://michaelseleey.blogspot.com/ .


   P.S. I'm traveling to Norway this summer to study peace advocacy and Norwegian history at the Nobel Institute and the University of Oslo respectively. Because of this, I've started another blog to chronicle those adventures. Find that at: http://fjordfriends.blogspot.com/ .

Yours,
Michael Seeley

Sunday, May 22, 2011

The Questionable Tales: a Steampunk Trio


            My college's theatre put on a marvelous production of Shakespeare's A Winter's Tale this spring. In addition to being marvelously well done, the show was costumed and staged with Steampunk. Steampunk is a genre of literature that examines an alternative history of the world. It asks what might have happened had mankind focused on steam as a powerful resource during the Victorian era; would new technologies have developed? Truly, it's an interesting and fun world to play in. More can be found at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steampunk .

            Regardless, as a result of the show's brilliant costuming and staging, I felt inspired to write a short collection of Steampunk stories. So, I offer The Questionable Tales: a Steampunk Trio for your review:

            Amid an alternative world of airships, cogs, and steam, the Questionable travels the globe, carrying the wealthy and powerful. Aboard the dirigible, high society gambles, relaxes, and plays. Yet, all is not peaceful. Within these Steampunk tales, morals are questioned, love is tested, and clouds float by, oblivious to human suffering.

            The Questionable Tales offer the reader a brief collection of thought-provoking stories amid an alternative world. Indeed, what could be achieved had mankind better used the power of steam? In this changed Victorian world, the Questionable flies. An airship designed for and by the wealthy, she floats above the world. Within this collection, three stories of the sleek vessel come to light. In A Questionable Affair, an insulted man must protect the villain he is also forced to kill. Two impoverished lovers, awarded passage aboard the Questionable, find their love and morals tested amid a new world of opulence in Unattainable Tangibility. Finally, A Means to Produce asks how the world might be changed if Karl Marx had become disillusioned with Europe. Traveling to the Raj, the Communist find a new audience to inspire, and India is forever changed.

            Soon, it will be available at Barnes and Noble, Amazon, and many other online eBook stores. Currently, it is free for download at Smashwords at the following link: http://www.smashwords.com/books/view/61351 .

(Smashwords is an incredibly wonderful site devoted to independent authors)

I hope you enjoy the new world and my adventures within it!


Tuesday, May 10, 2011

Napoleonic Nepotism and Meritocracy


The Napoleonic Historical Society Newsletter (All Rights Reserved)
  
   I was very pleased to hear some exciting news the other day! The following article was recently published within the Napoleonic Historical Society's Newsletter. My first professionally published work, it examines how Napoleon's governmental policies eventually shifted from the Revolutionary principle of meritocracy towards nepotism. Enjoy!
The Weight of Change: Meritocracy and Nepotism Within Napoleonic Europe
By Michael Seeley
            Truly, Europe amid the early Nineteenth Century reeled with newfound ideals. The fraternal cries for revolution that resounded across la France had shaken that proud state to its core, and, in turn, had unsettled the world's previously unshakable values. Into this maelstrom of  conflicting ideals and violent struggle, Napoleon Bonaparte emerged as the new leader of France. With his ascension came a desire to further the changes brought about by the Revolution. Among these reforms was a transition from an aristocratic order based upon heritage to a meritocratic state based on ability. Yet, even the new leader was not infallible. Although Napoleon implemented reforms that fostered meritocratic government, the promotion of his family is an iconic example of the abuse of nepotism, which contributed to the man's downfall.
            Before examining the meritocratic reforms of Napoleonic France, one must first consider the previous regime under the Bourbon monarchy. Indeed, in this aristocratic France, the bloodline was all powerful. Without the proper, noble heritage, one's job, rights, power, marriage opportunities, and lifestyle were highly limited. Napoleon was only allowed into officer training as a direct result of an obscure connection to minor nobility. Without this link and deprived of training, Napoleon's martial career may not have revealed the genius we recognize today.
            In spite of this noble heritage, Napoleon continued to face oppression from the aristocracy. The Corsican spoke French with a heavy accent, wore threadbare clothing, and avoided expensive entertainment. For this, he was constantly rebuked and harangued by his fellow cadets, themselves wealthy by comparison. "Always alone among men," he wrote, "I come home to dream by myself and give myself over to all the forces of my melancholy."[i] The other cadets' opulence and luxurious snobbery angered and wounded him greatly, and he never forgot their arrogance; once Napoleon was in power, changes were enacted.
            Perhaps his hand was forced, however. As the nobility composed nearly the entirety of French governmental leadership and military command, the Revolution was initially crippling to the French state's leadership. For instance, it is one of the major ironies of the Revolution that the French Navy, the noblest of the military branches, never recovered and rarely performed well after the political purging of its officers. Indeed, there were so many vacancies at the top (pun intended) that when Napoleon came to power, a new system needed to be enacted. Facing this overwhelming problem, Bonaparte drew upon his ever-ready ingenuity. If an ancient, groomed cadre of leadership no longer remained, men would be promoted on the basis of their abilities, their merits. Notably, Napoleon described this new policy as "la carrière ouverte aux talents", or careers open to the talented.[ii] No longer would men be stratified by their parentage; France would now rise as a state of meritocracy.
            Under Napoleon's leadership, this newfound ideal was enacted. Common soldiers displaying bravery or intelligence were promoted. Indeed, General Jean-Andoche Junot, one of Napoleon's most important aides, began his career as an enlisted man. Meeting the future Emperor at Toulon, Sergeant Junot displayed bravery under fire and became attached to Napoleon's staff. Joachim Murat, the son of common tavern-keepers, rose to the rank of Marshal and became Napoleon's brother-in-law. Furthermore, special orders were instituted to promote and honor prowess in all fields. For instance, the Napoleonic government set about praising those skilled in art, the sciences, or martial abilities through the Légion d'honneur, the country's first order of merit. When some decried this as being superfluous, Napoleon famously responded, "It is with such baubles that men are led."[iii] As such, France soon became a state in which leadership positions where occupied by those most qualified to occupy them.
            And yet, this meritocracy was not entirely pervasive, for the Emperor eventually fell into the trap of nepotism. Dr. Ben Weider, the well respected, late President of the International Napoleonic Society, once wrote that, "There is no doubt that it would have been better for Napoleon if he had not had brothers."[iv] Having examined the actions of Napoleon's family, it is highly difficult to disagree.
            As the First Empire expanded, Napoleon found himself with several states lacking monarchical leadership. While democratic and enlightened reforms were enacted in these regions, the Emperor also found it fitting to place members of his family on these vacant thrones. Truly, this was one of the worst mistakes of Napoleon's career, and the slip from meritocracy into nepotism would be costly.
            Each brother continually failed Napoleon. Their shortcomings are so prominent that historian R. F. Delderfield even refers to them as the "Golden Millstones," a sobriquet most accurate. [v]  Indeed, their faults are aggravating in their frequency.
            Louis continually refused to abide with the Continental System and drove Holland away from Revolutionary principles. Napoleon's letters, scathing at points, decry Louis' failures. "Hearken to a wiser man than yourself: return from the path on to which you have strayed! ... Good sense and policy are necessary to the government of States,- not your unhealthy bile," wrote Napoleon. [vi] Louis' inadequacies were mirrored in other siblings, however.
            For his part, Joseph plotted behind his brother's back, proved incompetent in Spain, and remained lethargic before the Battle of Paris. Succinctly, the Emperor wrote, "He has not shown either military talent, or care in government."[vii] The sad list continues with Lucien, who remained ever critical of Napoleon's choices and abandoned the entire family by attempting to flee to America.[viii] Jérôme was constantly shirking duties[ix]; Murat betrayed Napoleon by allying with the Sixth Coalition[x]; Bernadotte, not technically a brother but initially valued as such through his relationship with the Clary sisters, attacked Napoleonic France at the head of the Swedish army.[xi] In short, every single brother failed Napoleon throughout his career, a fact which opens itself up to commentary.
            As a Corsican, Napoleon valued family as an irreplaceable asset. In the Corsican tradition, family was central, binding, and worth dying to protect.[xii] As such, Napoleon's promotion of his siblings is easily reconcilable with his ethnic identity. Yet, the failures present within the other Bonaparte brothers weighed Napoleon down and eventually contributed to his defeat and abdication.
    In light of this, a final, startling question presents itself: had the Emperor adhered to his meritocratic policies and avoided nepotism, would Napoleonic France have endured?







[i] David Grubin, dir., Napoleon: To Destiny. DVD (United States: Devillier Donegan Enterprises, 2000).
[ii] Thomas Carlyle, "Parliamentary History of the French Revolution," in Critical and Miscellaneous Essays by Thomas Carlyle, Volume 5 (Boston: Phillips, Samson, and Company, 1855), 516.
[iii] J. David Markham, Napoleon for Dummies (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Publishing, Inc, 2005), 259.
[iv] Ben Weider,  "Napoleon: Man of Peace,"  accessed March the 12th, 2011 from http://www.napoleon-series.org/ins/weider/c_peace.html .
[v] Ronald F. Delderfield, The Golden Millstones: Napoleon's Brothers and Sisters (New York: Harper & Row, 1964).
[vi] Mary Loyd, trans., New Letters of Napoleon I (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1897), 183.
[vii] Loyd, New Letters of Napoleon I, 300.
[viii] Robert Harvey, The War of Wars: The Great European Conflict 1793-1815 (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2006), 428.
[ix] Harvey, The War of Wars, 338.
[x] David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon: The Mind and Method of History's Greatest Soldier (New York: Scribner Publishing, 1966), 950.
[xi] Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 874.
[xii] Weider, "Napoleon: Man of Peace." 

Franco-American Diplomacy



The following paper was written for a Methods and Philosophy of History course and examines how the friendship America and France initially experienced eventually collapsed amid the early 1800s.
The XYZ Affair



A Collapsing Friendship: Franco-American Diplomacy in the Early 19th Century



            Within the early stages of American independence, the relatively small republic desperately sought international aid to bolster their claims of sovereignty. As such, the Americans turned to France for financial and martial help during the American Revolution. While this aid was initially granted, Franco-American relations soon began to shift. Indeed, by 1812, the states were close to open warfare. As each state developed early perspectives on national identity, several key diplomatic misunderstandings led to the sharp deterioration in Franco-American amity; this shift was significantly fueled by each country's interaction with a third power - Great Britain.
            These critical misunderstandings are varying in nature, but each profoundly affected the diplomatic relations between France and the United States. For instance, the misinterpretation of Anglo-American relations by France and the complex shifting power struggle among the three states are key to understanding the deterioration of Franco-American diplomacy. Great Britain was the initial link between the other two states; the Franco-American friendship grew out of the United States' War of Independence with Great Britain. As that conflict came to a close, a martial and economic alliance was founded between France and America. While this treaty provided for an initial intense friendship, it also offered several opportunities for miscommunication.
            The 1798 Treaty of Alliance between France and the United States officially founded an economic and martial agreement between those two states against the British. This work listed several key points establishing this friendship. For instance, Article Three of that document states that "The two contracting Parties shall each on its own Part, and in the manner it may judge most proper, make all the efforts in its Power, against their common Enemy, in order to attain the end proposed." France and the United States were to reduce British power in whatever method was deemed necessary. Yet, arising from these clauses came a precedent that was later broken in two ways. [1]
            While France and the United States had allied to defeat Great Britain, America eventually found it profitable to reestablish friendship with her mother country. The connections between the freed colonies and their previous colonizer remained strong; economic ties were especially strong. For instance, much of New England relied upon Great Britain for job opportunities and trade. After the War of Independence, the populace of that region demanded a renewal of trade in order to boost their economy. As a result, the 1794 Jay's Treaty was enacted.[2]
            Beneficial for both Great Britain and the United States, this treaty essentially reestablished ties of friendship between the two states. Indeed, the opening article offers clear evidence of a desire for renewed amity: "There shall be a firm inviolable and universal Peace, and a true and sincere Friendship between His Britannic Majesty, His Heirs and Successors, and the United States of America." Furthermore, the treaty called for Great Britain to remove troops from the Northwest Territory. In return, the United States would honor debts to Great Britain that had been incurred before the War of Independence. Yet, the treaty deeply angered France, who saw America's new alliance with Great Britain as a betrayal of her coalition with France.[3]
            Additionally, the Franco-American 1778 Treaty of Alliance led to a controversial predicament for the American government amidst the French Revolution. A decade after the alliance had been formed between America and France, the latter experienced her own revolution. This tumultuous event provided for complete and irrevocable governmental shifts in France; her economy, military, political foundations, and social order were dramatically altered. Her diplomatic relations with the United States changed as well. As the 1778 Treaty called for a martial alliance between the two states, the French government firmly believed that America should come to her aid in the Wars of the Coalition following the French Revolution.[4]
            However, the friendship America held for France was, even then, beginning to slip. Although she had depended heavily upon France for success in her recent War of Independence, many felt that the new republic should establish herself without the aid of European powers, who had a definite history of exploiting the New World. Thus, "Post-War nationalism contributed to the slighting of France because it was difficult to exult in the glory of America while at the same time stressing the recent dependence on France." Because of this, America found it problematic to support France during the Wars of the Coalition.[5]
            In fact, little assistance came from the new American republic, for a crisis had formed within American politics. Many, including Thomas Jefferson, desired for American recognition of France's new government. Yet, this recognition did not entail military aid as well. Many felt that the French Revolutionary government was too radical; the execution of King Louis XVI had bolstered these fears. President Washington eventually decided not to assist France militarily in her new wars. His Neutrality Proclamation of 1794 declared that France would receive no martial aid from the United States.
"Whereas it appears that a state of war exists between Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, and the United Netherlands on the one part and France on the other, and the duty and interest of the United States require that they should with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent powers."
In order to avoid supporting the radicals controlling the French government, America resolved to withhold aid. However, further consequences would arise from this controversial decision.[6]
            Since America was establishing a renewed semi-friendship with Great Britain, as well as withholding aid for France's European military struggle, France responded in turn. This reprisal came in the form of the infamous XYZ affair. When John Adams took the Presidential office in 1797, he hoped to bolster the dying friendship between America and France. A special diplomatic mission was dispatched for Paris. Yet, these envoys were met with a scandalous reception. Before Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, France's Foreign Minister, agreed to even meet with Adams' diplomats, he demanded a massive bribe. The humiliating effects of this demand provided for a further degeneration of Franco-American diplomacy.[7]
            The next phase of diplomatic deterioration included two facets: the undeclared naval Quasi-War between France and the United States and the various Congressional laws enacted to limit French activity within America. As they moved into the Nineteenth Century, each state began to feel less friendly towards the other. Within a decade, the two states would even be on the verge of official declarations of war.
            In the wake of the humiliating XYZ Affair, the United States desired revenge for France's slight. Concurrently, France still burned with feelings of betrayal over the Jay's Treaty. As such, the states sought ways to avenge themselves upon the other. The Quasi-War emerged out of these desires. The Quasi-War was an undeclared martial conflict between the two countries upon the oceans. As the states remained separated by the Atlantic, no military operations would be conducted on land amid the Quasi-War. Instead, a conflict of naval forces arose. However, "naval forces" may be a misnomer in regards to the American fleet. For America "had no navy. Except for a few small revenue cutters, each manned by crews of six men, it did not have a single national vessel in commission." Thus, the term "Quasi-War" generally reflected attacks from French naval vessels upon American shipping.[8]
            Powerless to stop the French attacks, America grew increasingly resentful towards France. Meanwhile, French attacks grew in intensity and frequency. The waters of the Caribbean Sea provided for many such assaults. In these waters, American shipping was repeatedly captured, the country's merchantmen suffering for the two governments' disagreements. "French captors, as has been indicated, looted ships, sometimes committed atrocities against crew members and passengers, and frequently condemned vessels illegally." However, through American regional cooperation, the country was eventually able to combat the French attacks.[9]
            As a result of an unrelated piracy conflict with Algiers, America was in the process of forming a navy when the Quasi-War was initialed. While no vessels were completed, several powerful "super-frigates" were in the midst of construction. Indeed, these vessels were designed to out-sail any European frigate, and once completed, would pose a serious threat to the French naval forces attacking American shipping. As such, the construction process for these vessels was increased; Adams' administration was adamant that the naval armaments be finished. Eventually, the new American navy was formed and began taking French prizes of war. Thus, both combatants in the semi-war adopted increasingly hostile stances toward the other.[10]
            While naval engagements continued amid the Caribbean Sea and off the coasts of the United States, other measures were being conducted by the United States' Congress. In conjunction with the martial efforts of the Quasi-War, the U.S. Congress began to institute a series of legislation designed to protect America from enemy aliens and prevent seditious acts from undermining American government. These works of legislation, the Alien and Sedition Acts, included four distinct laws, each with implied slights toward France.
            The first of the Alien and Sedition acts was the Naturalization Act. Passed in the early summer of 1798, this piece of legislation increased the residence requirement for naturalization from five years to fourteen years. Next, the Alien Act was put into place. This work offered the President the freedom to arrest, imprison, and expel any enemy alien who has been deemed dangerous to the country. Furthermore, as described in the next act, the Alien Enemies Act, the American government offered the President the ability to apprehend and expel any resident aliens if their home countries were at war with the United States. Finally, the Sedition Act repressed freedom of speech by imposing restrictions and making it illegal to be caught "writing, printing, uttering or publishing any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the government of the United States." Within these pieces of legislation, Adams' government had granted itself nearly tyrannical power in an attempt to strike back at France. "'The alien and sedition acts,' Jefferson said in January 1799, 'have already operated as a powerful sedative of the XYZ inflammation.'" This legislation would have other effects as well.[11]
            The legislative backlash against the French also possessed political ramifications within America. For their part, the Alien and Sedition acts came to be extraordinarily unpopular. Indeed, fierce opposition, led by Thomas Jefferson and his Republicans, arose. This opposition would eventually label the acts as unconstitutional, and the issue would be a contributing factor to Jefferson's election to the Presidency in his Revolution of 1800. The shifting political atmosphere would be mirrored in France as well; new leaders of differing ideologies were emerging in that country. Napoleon Bonaparte came to power in November of 1799, and his ascension would come to alter Franco-American diplomacy.[12]
            With the arrival of two new leaders in France and the United States, the unofficial Quasi-War came to a close. Furthermore, Franco-American diplomacy experienced a newfound, if brief, strengthening. As Napoleon and Jefferson began to consolidate their power structures, peace became advantageous for both parties. Because of this, an American delegation met with French diplomats in Paris. They felt "it was their duty to conclude a treaty rather than return empty-handed. Their decision, they felt, served the interest of their government and of their people." Stringent efforts were conducted in order to reach a settlement. The American envoys succeeded in their mission, and the Convention of Mortefontaine was reached.[13]
            The Convention of Mortefontaine, variably called the Convention of 1800, established "a firm, inviolable, and universal peace, and a true and sincere Friendship between the French Republic, and the United States of America." All naval hostiles were ceased, captured ships were to be returned, and free trade was reestablished. Essentially, all remnants of the discontent over America's adoption of the 1794 Jay's Treaty and France's use of the XYZ affair were to be forgotten. Peace and friendship were once more restored to the two countries. While this amity would not remain indefinitely, it did provide for a pivotal event in American history.[14]
            In the years immediately following the cessation of hostilities during the Quasi-War, France and America experienced a renewed friendship. This harmony is most notable as it allowed for the Louisiana Purchase to occur. This monumental land transfer transpired for several reasons. For her part, America desperately wanted to expand. While her territorial holdings were sufficient for her population at the time, the country was continuing to expand rapidly. As such, Jefferson sought an outlet for continued growth. He found it amid Napoleon's willingness to abandon his North American holdings. As a result of his worsening naval war with Great Britain, coupled with the dreadful situation in Haiti, Napoleon came to see the futility of attempting to maintain a trans-continental empire. Because of this, he was also willing to transfer the entire Louisiana territory to American control. Indeed,
"The First Consul of the French Republic desiring to give to the United States a strong proof of his friendship doth hereby cede to the United States in the name of the French Republic forever and in full Sovereignty the said territory with all its rights and appurtenances."
With this acquiescence, America gained vast, new territory, and France was given funds to continue its defensive war against the insatiable Great Britain. Yet, the "friendship" of which Napoleon spoke was not to last.[15]
            While America remained geographically and ideologically distant from Europe, events there would further deteriorate Franco-American relations. The Wars of the Coalition against Napoleonic France were increasing in scope and magnitude. The Ancien Régime monarchies, led by Great Britain, continued to resent the Revolutionary principles of France. Constant warfare was underway to depose Napoleon and return France to a pre-Revolutionary state of affairs. Within this English-led maelstrom, Franco-American diplomacy again began to falter.
            Previously, American shipping had been attacked during the Quasi-War. As President Jefferson's second term reached its conclusion, this state of affairs began to resurface. As President Madison took office, America, still a declared neutral power, was once again being exploited. Combatants on each side of the War of the Coalitions were again capturing American shipping as prizes of war. These acts led to debates on how America should conduct her neutrality. Some, including Madison, held that an increase in military spending would indicate a hostile nature belying the country's neutrality. Indeed, if Great Britain were to notice an increase in warships patrolling the oceans, her government would grow resentful of the increased American presence on the oceans. Rather than implementing this strategy, the President desired to enact economic sanctions against opposing powers. This tactic, put in place until American shipping rights were respected on the high seas, would ensure that Great Britain and France suffered from their actions while America continued to maintain her peaceful mantle of neutrality. [16]
            Conversely, others held a different approach to neutrality. They argued that instead of utilizing economic restrictions, the United States must adopt an "'energetic' neutrality." This policy indicated a level of armed impartiality, which "necessarily implied increased defense expenditures, especially on the navy." With increased armament, some argued, America would be respected as a power ready for war; thus, her shipping rights would be respected.[17]
          France, on the other hand, was able to justify her exploitation of neutral American shipping through the actions of Great Britain. "To hear it from Paris, London had started this cycle of depredation, having been the first to violate the rights of neutral carriers. France was merely responding in kind. What Britain had begun Britain must end. Only then would France follow suit." Because the British were gaining through their attacks on U.S. shipping, France reasoned that they could as well. Napoleon, writing to his Minister of Justice, ordered that captures of American shipping be "settled on the spot; there can be no doubt about the matter." If Great Britain would violate America's neutrality, France, attacked on all sides, could also not afford to honor the United States' impartiality.[18]
            Because of this, a growing resentment towards France was again born among Americans. In fact, the British and French exploitation of American rights and goods fostered so much anger within the United States, that another war was eventually declared. In 1812, President Madison led his country to war against Great Britain. However, another vital and relatively unknown fact must come to light here. "Shortly before Congress declared war on Britain in June 1812, the United States Senate came within two votes of declaring war on France as well." Indeed, this fact indicates a truly incredible shift. Only thirty years previous, France and the United States had signed a treaty of alliance. Each state had since come to abuse the other for personal gain, abandoning the friendship established through the 1778 Treaty of Alliance. How can this dynamic shift be accounted for?[19]
            After examining the evidence, it becomes clear that Great Britain's involvement with and relations to the other two countries is the primary cause for their deterioration of Franco-American diplomatic amity. Mutual hatred of Great Britain brought France and the United States together amidst the American War of Independence. Similarly, it was America's reestablishment of friendship with Great Britain through the 1794 Jay's Treaty that would launch France and the United States into its harrowing diplomatic decline. The XYZ Affair was largely caused by Jay's Treaty; the Quasi-War was a result of the XYZ Affair. Later, the Louisiana Purchase was conducted by Napoleon in order to gain resources for his combat against Great Britain. Finally, it was Great Britain's continual abuse of American neutrality that caused France to respond likewise, further worsening Franco-American diplomacy. Every aspect of the diplomatic deterioration can be traced to Great Britain's involvement.
                As a result of  mutual abhorrence of Great Britain at the end of the Eighteenth Century, coupled with America's struggle for independence, an alliance between America and France was born. However, this amity soon fell into decline as a result of diplomatic miscommunications brought about by Great Britain's interaction with the other two states. By the outset of the War of 1812, Franco-American relations were on the verge of outright declared war. While rather extraordinary, this dynamic shift is truly reflective of its tumultuous age, a time in which humanity transitioned into the modern world.



[1] Hunter Miller, ed., "Treaty of Alliance Between The United States and France; February 6, 1778" in Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1931). Accessed April 22nd, 2011 from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fr1788-2.asp ; Jonathan R. Dull, A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 89-96.
[2] J.G.A. Stagg, Mr. Madison's War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American republic, 1783–1830 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 253-256.
[3] Miller, ed., "The Jay's Treaty; November 19, 1794" in Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America.  Accessed April 22nd, 2011 from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/jay.asp.
[4] Peter J. Albert and Ronald Hoffman, eds., Diplomacy and Revolution: The Franco-American Alliance of 1798 (Charlottesville VA: University Press of Virginia, 1981), 172-173.
[5] William C. Stinchcombe, The American Revolution and the French Alliance (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1969), 209.
[6] R. R. Palmer, "The Dubious Democrat: Thomas Jefferson in Bourbon France" in Political Science Quarterly, Sept. 1957, 388. Accessed April 18th, 2011 from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2145325 ; John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, eds. "Proclamation 4 - Neutrality of the United States in the War Involving Austria, Prussia, Sardinia, Great Britain, and the United Netherlands Against France" in The American Presidency Project. Accessed April 19th, 2011 from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=65475 .
[7] William C. Stinchcombe, The XYZ Affair (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980), 56-57.
[8] Alexander DeConde, The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War with France 1797-1801 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966), 125.
[9] Ibid, 125.
[10] Ibid, 127-129.
[11] Ibid, 194 ; An Act in Addition to the Act, Entitled "An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, July 14th, 1798. Accessed April 22nd, 2011 from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/sedact.asp ; An Act Respecting Alien Enemies, July 6th, 1798. Accessed April 22nd, 2011 from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/alien.asp .
[12] Alexander DeConde, The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War with France 1797-1801, 285-288.
[13] Ibid, 256.
[14] Hunter Miller, ed., " France - Convention of 1800" in Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1931). Accessed April 26th, 2011 from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fr1788-2.asp .
[15] The Louisiana Purchase, National Archives and Records Administration. Accessed April 23rd, 2011 from http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/american_originals/louistxt.html ; Robert M. Johnstone, Jr., Jefferson and the Presidency: Leadership in the Young Republic (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), 67-75.
[16] J.G.A. Stagg, Mr. Madison's War, 53-85.
[17] Ibid, 53-85.
[18] Peter P. Hill, Napoleon's Troublesome Americans: Franco-American Relations, 1804-1815 (Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005), 21. ; Mary Loyd, trans., Letter to M. Regnier in New Letters of Napoleon I (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1897), 248.
[19] Peter P. Hill, Napoleon's Troublesome Americans: Franco-American Relations, 1804-1815, ix.


Bibliography
Albert, Peter J., and Ronald Hoffman, eds., Diplomacy and Revolution: The Franco-American Alliance of 1798. Charlottesville VA: University Press of Virginia, 1981.



"An Act in Addition to the Act, Entitled "An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, July 14th, 1798."" The Avalon Project. Accessed April 22nd, 2011 from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/sedact.asp .

"An Act Respecting Alien Enemies, July 6th, 1798." The Avalon Project. Accessed April 22nd, 2011 from http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/alien.asp .
DeConde, Alexander. The Quasi-War: The Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War with France 1797-1801. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966.
Dull, Jonathan R.. A Diplomatic History of the American Revolution. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985.

Hill, Peter P.. Napoleon's Troublesome Americans: Franco-American Relations, 1804-1815. Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, 2005
Johnstone Jr., Robert M.. Jefferson and the Presidency: Leadership in the Young Republic. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978.
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