Napoleonic Nepotism and Meritocracy



The Napoleonic Historical Society Newsletter (All Rights Reserved)

  

   I was very pleased to hear some exciting news the other day! The following article was recently published within the Napoleonic Historical Society's Newsletter. My first professionally published work, it examines how Napoleon's governmental policies eventually shifted from the Revolutionary principle of meritocracy towards nepotism. Enjoy!

The Weight of Change: Meritocracy and Nepotism Within Napoleonic Europe

By Michael Seeley

            Truly, Europe amid the early Nineteenth Century reeled with newfound ideals. The fraternal cries for revolution that resounded across la France had shaken that proud state to its core, and, in turn, had unsettled the world's previously unshakable values. Into this maelstrom of  conflicting ideals and violent struggle, Napoleon Bonaparte emerged as the new leader of France. With his ascension came a desire to further the changes brought about by the Revolution. Among these reforms was a transition from an aristocratic order based upon heritage to a meritocratic state based on ability. Yet, even the new leader was not infallible. Although Napoleon implemented reforms that fostered meritocratic government, the promotion of his family is an iconic example of the abuse of nepotism, which contributed to the man's downfall.

            Before examining the meritocratic reforms of Napoleonic France, one must first consider the previous regime under the Bourbon monarchy. Indeed, in this aristocratic France, the bloodline was all powerful. Without the proper, noble heritage, one's job, rights, power, marriage opportunities, and lifestyle were highly limited. Napoleon was only allowed into officer training as a direct result of an obscure connection to minor nobility. Without this link and deprived of training, Napoleon's martial career may not have revealed the genius we recognize today.

            In spite of this noble heritage, Napoleon continued to face oppression from the aristocracy. The Corsican spoke French with a heavy accent, wore threadbare clothing, and avoided expensive entertainment. For this, he was constantly rebuked and harangued by his fellow cadets, themselves wealthy by comparison. "Always alone among men," he wrote, "I come home to dream by myself and give myself over to all the forces of my melancholy."[i] The other cadets' opulence and luxurious snobbery angered and wounded him greatly, and he never forgot their arrogance; once Napoleon was in power, changes were enacted.

            Perhaps his hand was forced, however. As the nobility composed nearly the entirety of French governmental leadership and military command, the Revolution was initially crippling to the French state's leadership. For instance, it is one of the major ironies of the Revolution that the French Navy, the noblest of the military branches, never recovered and rarely performed well after the political purging of its officers. Indeed, there were so many vacancies at the top (pun intended) that when Napoleon came to power, a new system needed to be enacted. Facing this overwhelming problem, Bonaparte drew upon his ever-ready ingenuity. If an ancient, groomed cadre of leadership no longer remained, men would be promoted on the basis of their abilities, their merits. Notably, Napoleon described this new policy as "la carrière ouverte aux talents", or careers open to the talented.[ii] No longer would men be stratified by their parentage; France would now rise as a state of meritocracy.

            Under Napoleon's leadership, this newfound ideal was enacted. Common soldiers displaying bravery or intelligence were promoted. Indeed, General Jean-Andoche Junot, one of Napoleon's most important aides, began his career as an enlisted man. Meeting the future Emperor at Toulon, Sergeant Junot displayed bravery under fire and became attached to Napoleon's staff. Joachim Murat, the son of common tavern-keepers, rose to the rank of Marshal and became Napoleon's brother-in-law. Furthermore, special orders were instituted to promote and honor prowess in all fields. For instance, the Napoleonic government set about praising those skilled in art, the sciences, or martial abilities through the Légion d'honneur, the country's first order of merit. When some decried this as being superfluous, Napoleon famously responded, "It is with such baubles that men are led."[iii] As such, France soon became a state in which leadership positions where occupied by those most qualified to occupy them.

            And yet, this meritocracy was not entirely pervasive, for the Emperor eventually fell into the trap of nepotism. Dr. Ben Weider, the well respected, late President of the International Napoleonic Society, once wrote that, "There is no doubt that it would have been better for Napoleon if he had not had brothers."[iv] Having examined the actions of Napoleon's family, it is highly difficult to disagree.

            As the First Empire expanded, Napoleon found himself with several states lacking monarchical leadership. While democratic and enlightened reforms were enacted in these regions, the Emperor also found it fitting to place members of his family on these vacant thrones. Truly, this was one of the worst mistakes of Napoleon's career, and the slip from meritocracy into nepotism would be costly.

            Each brother continually failed Napoleon. Their shortcomings are so prominent that historian R. F. Delderfield even refers to them as the "Golden Millstones," a sobriquet most accurate. [v]  Indeed, their faults are aggravating in their frequency.

            Louis continually refused to abide with the Continental System and drove Holland away from Revolutionary principles. Napoleon's letters, scathing at points, decry Louis' failures. "Hearken to a wiser man than yourself: return from the path on to which you have strayed! ... Good sense and policy are necessary to the government of States,- not your unhealthy bile," wrote Napoleon. [vi] Louis' inadequacies were mirrored in other siblings, however.

            For his part, Joseph plotted behind his brother's back, proved incompetent in Spain, and remained lethargic before the Battle of Paris. Succinctly, the Emperor wrote, "He has not shown either military talent, or care in government."[vii] The sad list continues with Lucien, who remained ever critical of Napoleon's choices and abandoned the entire family by attempting to flee to America.[viii] Jérôme was constantly shirking duties[ix]; Murat betrayed Napoleon by allying with the Sixth Coalition[x]; Bernadotte, not technically a brother but initially valued as such through his relationship with the Clary sisters, attacked Napoleonic France at the head of the Swedish army.[xi] In short, every single brother failed Napoleon throughout his career, a fact which opens itself up to commentary.

            As a Corsican, Napoleon valued family as an irreplaceable asset. In the Corsican tradition, family was central, binding, and worth dying to protect.[xii] As such, Napoleon's promotion of his siblings is easily reconcilable with his ethnic identity. Yet, the failures present within the other Bonaparte brothers weighed Napoleon down and eventually contributed to his defeat and abdication.

    In light of this, a final, startling question presents itself: had the Emperor adhered to his meritocratic policies and avoided nepotism, would Napoleonic France have endured?

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[i] David Grubin, dir., Napoleon: To Destiny. DVD (United States: Devillier Donegan Enterprises, 2000).

[ii] Thomas Carlyle, "Parliamentary History of the French Revolution," in Critical and Miscellaneous Essays by Thomas Carlyle, Volume 5 (Boston: Phillips, Samson, and Company, 1855), 516.

[iii] J. David Markham, Napoleon for Dummies (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Publishing, Inc, 2005), 259.

[iv] Ben Weider,  "Napoleon: Man of Peace,"  accessed March the 12th, 2011 from http://www.napoleon-series.org/ins/weider/c_peace.html .

[v] Ronald F. Delderfield, The Golden Millstones: Napoleon's Brothers and Sisters (New York: Harper & Row, 1964).

[vi] Mary Loyd, trans., New Letters of Napoleon I (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1897), 183.

[vii] Loyd, New Letters of Napoleon I, 300.

[viii] Robert Harvey, The War of Wars: The Great European Conflict 1793-1815 (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2006), 428.

[ix] Harvey, The War of Wars, 338.

[x] David G. Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon: The Mind and Method of History's Greatest Soldier (New York: Scribner Publishing, 1966), 950.

[xi] Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, 874.

[xii] Weider, "Napoleon: Man of Peace."